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Abstract: A particular challenge for mountainous areas in Italy is the definition 
of suitable governance models for local resources. Several solutions have been 
proposed over time, resulting in the co-existence of a number of decision-making 
centers. A crucial role is played by municipalities, but, in recent years, village 
commons – regola (singular) / regole (plural) in the local language – have been 
re-constituted as institutions with local power. In this dynamic context, little is 
known on how municipalities and regole interact. This paper aims at improving the 
understanding of local governance of mountain areas in the Veneto Region, from 
the viewpoint of municipalities, which represent the political, legal and adminis-
trative authority. The analysis is grounded in the polycentric governance litera-
ture, especially crucial in drawing attention to level and extent of  cooperation, 
trustworthiness, mutual learning and effort for adaptation. Tensions, conflicts and 
conflict-resolution mechanisms were also assessed. We carried out a survey of 
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14 municipalities containing regole within their administrative jurisdictions. The 
results of our work provide evidence that this relationship is mostly a synergistic 
one. Municipalities showed adaptive capacity in mirroring values and views of 
the regole and proved willing to share responsibilities. Their decisions were for-
mulated whilst taking into account the need for creating the appropriate linkages 
with local communities. Where conflicts or discontent have emerged, they have 
been mostly resolved, or considered as reflecting a need for greater coordination. 
This outcome can be looked upon as a local polycentric governance innovation 
that so far has only partially received policy support at the regional level. We 
conclude that municipalities will continue to play a central role in regulation of 
local-level socio-economic dynamics, remaining the institutional reference point 
for mountainous areas in the Veneto Region.
Keywords: Commons, common property, municipality, polycentric governance, 
forest management
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The definition of suitable governance models for mountainous areas in Italy is 
a challenge for policy makers (Pettenella 1994; Secco et al. 2011). Mountains 
cover 76.8% of the national land base and are very delicate systems, both from 
socio-economic and environmental standpoints. Hence, they need dedicated 
policies dealing with sustainable economic development, management and con-
servation of natural resources, urban planning and infrastructure, tourism and 
provision of social services. A particular concern was, and still is, identification 
of the appropriate institutional scale for governance in the broader context of 
the devolutionary trend that has progressively characterized the Italian political-
administrative model since the 1970s (Saccone et al. 2013). Several solutions 
have been proposed over time, resulting in the co-existence of multiple decision-
making centers with different competencies. A critical role at the local level is 
played by municipalities, which deal with most urban planning matters, land use 
changes authorization, building permits, as well as with provision of services to 
local communities.
Today, the existence of small municipalities in mountainous areas is jeop-
ardized by a wave of reforms introduced under the logic of lowering public 
expenditures and directed at administrative simplification (Ongaro and Valotti 
2008). Governmental actions aim at reducing the number of municipalities by 
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merging the smallest ones while simultaneously dismantling larger, supra-local 
administrative units. Though local trajectories may vary (Lippi 2000; Citroni 
and Di Giulio 2014), this radical change will affect the mechanisms that cur-
rently typify the administrative and institutional governance of mountain areas in 
Italy. Meanwhile, doubts have been raised about the capacity of such a simplified 
institutional scaffold to ensure subsidiarity in environmental and natural resource 
management, including forest and pasture land management, and to deal realisti-
cally with management issues at the local level (Gatto et al. 2012).
This top-down administrative reform is not the only course of institutional 
change in mountainous areas. Another parallel, more localized, bottom-up pro-
cess is represented by the re-emergence, in some alpine areas, of local, tradi-
tional institutions based on common property regimes, called ‘regola’ – plural: 
‘regole’ – in the local Venetian language. For over 600 years, regole were the sole 
local political institution and center of decision-making power in the majority of 
mountainous areas in Veneto, and catered for all the needs of local communities 
(Merlo et al. 1989). In the last two centuries, the regole experienced severe dis-
continuities as they lost legitimacy with the State and were replaced by munici-
palities in their role as local institution and owners/managers of resources. Today, 
a favorable political milieu is driving a shift in ownership regimes: full property 
rights to forests and pastures are being restituted from municipalities to regole, 
the latter being revitalized in their traditional role as managers of local resources.
In such an evolving institutional context, very little is known about how 
regole and municipalities are mutually interacting today as co-existing centers of 
local power on land and resources. Specifically, the perspective of municipalities 
appears to be rather neglected as compared with the growing attention received 
by regole both at local and broader geographical scales1. To address this gap, we 
have focused on exploring the relationships between municipalities and regole by 
performing research on the perspective of the first. We have selected the Veneto 
region (Northeastern Italy) as our case study area. Our focus on municipalities 
rests on at least three points of reasoning. First, municipalities currently have 
full political and administrative authority with respect to local natural resources. 
Any change affecting them is bound to have a strong impact on local governance. 
Second, of the two counterparts in property right reform, municipalities are the 
losers in terms of transfer of rights and powers, hence their viewpoint is crucial in 
understanding the local impact of changes and adaptation efforts. Third, we feel 
that the underrepresentation of the municipalities’ perspective may bias the cur-
rent analysis of local governance in Veneto. The Veneto region is an interesting 
case for assessing dynamics of governance between municipalities and regole: 
here, the process of re-constitution of regole is particularly active (Cacciavillani 
and Gaz 2010). This process is coupled with rapid devolution and loss of power by 
local and provincial governments, increasing potential for institutional  interplay 
1
 See e.g. the research carried out at the Centro Studi e documentazione sui demani civici e le 
proprietà collettive at the University of Trento, which focuses on common properties.
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and tensions between institutions at the local level. Hence, exploring how munici-
palities perceive these institutional changes in relation to regole – whether they 
promote collaboration, sharing and distribution of responsibilities and initiatives, 
negotiate gaps or overlaps in their respective areas of competence, and deal with 
conflicts and disputes – could improve understanding of reciprocal roles and out-
comes of these institutional changes.
1.2. Land-based activities and institutional change in Veneto
The Veneto Region occupies a total land area of around 1.8 million hectares, of 
which 420,000 ha are forests and 162,000 ha are pastures (Regione del Veneto 
2015), largely located in northern mountain areas of the region. Until the end of 
the 19th century, forestry and pastoral activities were economically very impor-
tant in the Alps. However, over the last century, wars and post-war periods char-
acterized by uneven rural development planning and ineffectual governmental 
policies for mountainous areas were important factors leading to emigration and 
abandonment of these activities in many mountain valleys. Today, the socio-eco-
nomic situation in the Venetian alpine region is heterogeneous. The most attrac-
tive and accessible areas have developed substantial tourist industries, which 
bring employment and income but also drive infrastructure development, land use 
changes and pressure on natural resources. Conversely, the most remote valleys 
are characterized by poor infrastructure development, unemployment, depopula-
tion and land abandonment, which lead to landscape degradation and soil stability 
problems. Local institutions, therefore, can play a crucial role in regulating use of 
resources, balancing needs for local economic development with those of conser-
vation of natural resources and landscape values.
Changes in land ownership that have occurred in mountainous areas of the 
Veneto are of particular interest and strictly connected to the evolution of insti-
tutional arrangements. Since the 13th century, the regole, as self-governing, 
village-level institutions based on common property regimes (Bromley 1991), 
were not only been widespread in the region, but similar institutional arrange-
ments were common throughout the Alps (Bravo and De Moor 2008)2. All 
resources owned by the regole, including forests and pastures, were held in 
common and managed through a set of complex, written rules – indeed, the 
name given to these institutions, ‘le regole’ may be literally translated as, ‘the 
rules’. The regole also played an important role in many aspect of local com-
munity life. The advent of French domination at the beginning of the 19th cen-
tury marked the beginning of institutional reform based on a centralized model, 
which forcibly deprived the regole of their political role and transferred own-
ership of forests and pastures to the municipalities across the majority of the 
Venetian Alps. Several regole were completely dissolved and ceased to function 
2
 For further insights in the rich history and meaning of the Regole see, amongst others, Merlo 
et al. 1989; Pieraccini 2008.
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while others, more strongly rooted in the local community, continued to exist 
informally (Gatto and Bogataj 2015). In 1927, surviving instances of collective 
land use and ownership throughout Italy came under attack by the Italian fas-
cist government, which privatized common lands suitable for agriculture, while 
placing more marginal lands, including forests and pastures, under control of 
municipalities (Grossi 1977; Carletti 2005). These changes further affected sur-
viving regole in the Veneto Region. With the fall of the fascist regime and the 
advent of the democratic republic after World War II, various legislative initia-
tives have progressively returned to commons their legal and social status and 
their rights. In 1994, the state (National Law 97/1994) transferred the power to 
define and reorganize the commons to the regional governments. The Veneto 
Region was first in line at a national level in legally recognizing the role of 
regole in protecting and sustainably managing mountain landscapes and giv-
ing way to a process of restitution of land ownership (Regional Law 26/1996). 
Despite the law having conferred the regole with private legal personhood, the 
law also assigned regole the formal capacity and responsibility to play an active 
role in local socio-economic development. To this extent, Gatto et al. (2012) 
have demonstrated commitment by regole to active management of forests and 
pastures, and to invest in improving or maintaining the quality of commonly-
held assets. The Regional Law also stipulated the coordination between regole 
and local public institutions, including municipalities, suggesting that the latter 
should take steps to actively inform and involve the former in public initiatives 
and consultations concerning local territorial development.
This long history of institutional change, coupled with top-down reform of 
state administration, is responsible for a complex and unprecedented current state 
of affairs, characterized by co-existence of multiple centers of local power. In 
this situation, institutional space has been created for synergies but also conflicts 
between municipalities and regole. While municipalities continue in their role as 
the local public administration – albeit with reduced capacity and financial sup-
port – the regole have been newly entrusted with a semi-public role. In contrast 
to the public nature of municipalities, decision-making on the land controlled by 
the regole occurs within a community formed by the descendants of the founding 
families of the regole. As such, decisions taken by municipalities represent the 
political will of a larger – and often more heterogeneous – social group including, 
among others, the “new highlanders”, or new inhabitants of alpine areas (Löffler 
et al. 2014), whereas the regole represent a smaller community with historical 
familial ties. Potential overlaps in areas of competence have emerged between 
municipalities and regole. These may be problematic where there is a significant 
mismatch between the membership of the regole and the local population resid-
ing in the municipality, and when there is poor communication between these 
institutions. Values, perception of property rights and boundaries, understandings 
of reciprocal roles, expectations regarding land use, and views regarding territo-
rial development trajectories by members of regole may not be echoed shared by 
municipal administrations. 
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Numerically speaking, the situation on the ground is as follows: in 2013, when 
this research was performed, there were 171 municipalities (Regione del Veneto 
2015) and 53 regole, of which 18 were the result of reconstitution processes fol-
lowing the 1996 regional law in the mountain areas of Veneto. Other reconstitu-
tion processes are underway (Gatto et al. 2012), so the number of regole in Veneto 
is likely to increase somewhat over the next decades. These 53 regole lie within 
the administrative boundaries of 17 municipalities (Figure 1).
Figure 1: On the left corner: Italy, with marked regional borders. The Veneto Region is 
 highlighted on the North-eastern part of the country. Main picture: focus on the Northern 
part of the Veneto Region (i.e. where regole exist), with marked municipal borders. 
Municipalities containing regole within their administrative boundaries are numbered with 
a progressive order (left to right, north to south) and grey colored. The administrations of 
light-grey  colored municipalities were not interviewed; whereas dark-grey colored munici-
palities were. Municipality #1: Comelico Superiore (4 regole); municipality #2: San Nicolò 
di Comelico (2 regole); municipality #3 San Pietro di Cadore (4 regole); municipality #4: 
Cortina d’Ampezzo (11 regole); municipality #5:Auronzo di Cadore (2 regole); municipal-
ity #6: Danta di Cadore (2 regole); municipality #7:Santo Stefano di Cadore (4 regole); 
 municipality #8:Vigo di Cadore (1 regola); municipality #9: San Vito di Cadore (3 regole); 
municipality #10: Colle Santa Lucia (3 regole); municipality #11: Selva di Cadore (3 regole); 
municipality #12: Borca di Cadore (1 regola); municipality #13: Pieve di Cadore (3 regole); 
municipality #14: Vodo di Cadore (2 regole); municipality #15: Zoldo Alto (2 regole); munic-
ipality #16: Chies d’Alpago (5 regole); municipality #17: Pedemonte (1 regola).
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2. Conceptual framework: polycentric governance
The need to understand how management rights and responsibilities are coordi-
nated between municipalities and regole calls for attention to theories and ideas 
of polycentric governance (Ostrom 2010; Nagendra and Ostrom 2012), as an 
appropriate conceptual approach to deal with situations of decentralized power 
and decision-making and to explore the interactions amongst different local-level 
institutions. Indeed, in complex social-ecological systems like the mountainous 
areas of Veneto Region, environmental management problems rarely manifest 
themselves at a single scale such that the division of management responsibil-
ity among different levels is perceived as desirable (Armitage 2008). This type 
of institutional arrangement, termed multi-level governance, is considered a key 
feature of adaptive resource governance and related concepts including network 
governance of the commons (Folke et al. 2005; Carlsson and Sandström 2007). 
Although desirable management practices may result from coordination of man-
agement powers across scales, outcomes are often unpredictable and analytical 
approaches to governance must incorporate themes of power relations and their 
mediation across scales (Armitage 2008).
Furthermore, increasing numbers and heterogeneity of actors holding differ-
ent bundles of rights and powers, may exaggerate problems of excludability and 
subtractability characteristic of common pool resource management dilemmas 
(Mwangi and Wardell 2012). Growing attention to polycentric schemes in the com-
mons literature may better capture these dynamics in situations featuring multiple 
levels of governance but also multiple centers of power (Andersson and Ostrom 
2008). The commons literature points to the likelihood of positive outcomes in 
polycentric systems when users have decision-making power to modify rules, and 
when these local institutions are nested in hierarchical governance arrangements 
that can provide support for local needs and circumstances (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom 
makes special reference in her design principles for enduring common property-
regimes to the necessity of organization in “multiple layers of nested enterprises” 
(Ostrom 2005, 269). Such nested systems can be considered polycentric when 
decision-making power is distributed among actors located at different levels. 
Institutional hierarchies, however, may not involve a clear multi-level structure 
nested in territorial jurisdictions (Poteete 2012). Poorly coordinated polycentric 
decision-making situations may feature contested authority, access regimes, and 
benefit sharing arrangements. In such situations, the polycentric governance lit-
erature might profitably support the assessment of local governance models like 
those of mountainous areas of Veneto, as it deals with interactions of overlapping 
networks of institutions rather than discreet territorial levels.
The division of territorial management responsibilities sets up a polycentric 
governance situation featuring cross-scale interaction and institutional interplay, 
described as the process by which potential synergies or conflicts come into 
being among different institutional layers (Young 2002; Marshall 2007). Gruby 
and Basurto (2014) argue that situations of institutional interplay may emerge as 
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actors gain or lose control over specific parts of decision-making processes, as 
linkages across organizational levels change, and with the relative autonomy of 
actors in polycentric governance arrangements. Coordination of decision-making 
and collaboration across polycentric systems requires actors to take decisions on 
how to coordinate governance tasks across levels. The governance principle of 
subsidiarity leaves some doubts as to how this might be done, especially in rap-
idly changing governance contexts, as multiple institutions with different aims at 
the local level are expected to resolve complex management dilemmas.
Our interest in the role of municipalities in the context of mountain natural 
resource management in the Veneto Region emerges out of several observations. 
There, indeed, governance re-structuring has not meant replacement of one gover-
nance level with others, but rather a process of governance negotiation, producing 
nested, polycentric governance scenarios. Recent complementary scholarship on 
common property regimes in the Veneto Region (Florian 2004; Carestiato 2008; 
Hampel 2012) insists that the co-existence of municipalities and regole rests on an 
unclear division of authority and power, and points to a need to improve coordina-
tion among these local-level institutions. Regole usually operate at a smaller geo-
graphical scale than municipalities, while their territories are not always wholly 
nested within municipalities. Thus it is not always appropriate to consider the 
relationship between municipalities and Regole in terms of multi-level, hierarchi-
cal or nested territorial jurisdictions. This further opens the scope for interplay of 
territorial actors which is worth exploring. Prior to the re-constitution of many 
regole, municipalities were responsible for several decades for managing forests 
and pastures, meaning that they have had to adapt to new governance dynamics 
once regole were re-constituted as landowners. If the decisions and actions of 
both municipalities and regole must be informed by a broad territorial vision that 
goes beyond sectorial or group interests to ensure sustainable territorial develop-
ment, their effectiveness as institutions must also depend on the nature, extent and 
quality of cooperative efforts between them.
3. Methodology
3.1. Key-aspects investigated
Understanding the nature of the governance relationships between municipalities 
and regole implies exploring a number of areas on which positions and opinions 
are formed by actors on specific local governance issues. Given the scant num-
ber of specific local analyses, it was not easy to define the final set of areas to be 
investigated. For this reason, our methodological approach is blended. We began 
by basing our analysis on the polycentric governance literature, especially useful 
in drawing attention to level and extent of cooperation, trustworthiness, mutual 
learning and effort put into adaptation (Ostrom 2010). Tensions, conflicts and 
conflict-resolution mechanisms were also deemed important areas for explora-
tion, given the unclear institutional context which held potential for contested 
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administrative claims over a specific task or role by both municipalities and 
regole. We then fine-tuned our set of key areas by complementing those found in 
the literature with a more grounded approach, based on informal exchanges with 
representatives of the public administration.
As a result, seven key areas were identified as reported below (more detail is 
given in Table 1):
1. the coordination mechanisms and patterns through which municipalities 
and regole interact, such as (i) who and how many persons in each munic-
ipality has the institutional task of interacting with regole; (ii) whether 
members of regole are also members of the town council; (iii) the for-
mal or informal nature of the relationships and (iv) how interactions are 
mainly shaped, i.e. general patterns of communication and coordination 
between regole and municipalities;
2. the modes in which consultation processes occur, who usually initiates 
them, what are the most important reasons for starting consultation pro-
cesses, how municipalities perceive the consultations they are legally 
obliged to hold with regole, especially on some particular territorial man-
agement decisions such as territorial development plans;
3. the fields of action, projects, activities and situations in which munici-
palities interact with regole, also beyond legal requirements. Four 
policy fields were considered, driven by the contents of the Regional 
Law: (i) environmental management and conservation, (ii) local eco-
nomic development, (iii) town and territorial management and devel-
opment and (iv) promotion of the local culture, customs and practices. 
Selection of these areas of interest was driven by wording in the Law 
encouraging municipalities to consult and involve regole in any initia-
tive in these fields;
4. the financial impacts on municipalities’ budgets linked to land restituted to 
regole, especially in the more marginalized valleys where traditional agro-
forestry activities are still an important source of income;
5. the occurrence, frequency and severity, both in the past and at present, of 
legal disputes and institutional tensions. These usually arise when both 
municipalities and regole mutually claim administrative jurisdiction over 
a specific task or role;
6. the occurrence, frequency and severity of social conflicts linked to the 
exclusion of non-members of regole from resource use and benefits;
7. the assessment by municipalities of the effectiveness of local regole in 
fulfilling their role as catalysts of local development as stated by the law. 
The following relevant fields of actions were considered: (i) environmen-
tal conservation, (ii) social development, (iii) local economic develop-
ment and (iv) tourism – the latter has been considered separately, given its 
major role in shaping economic development in the area.
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ns
/a
ct
iv
iti
es
/p
ol
ic
ie
s, 
an
d 
vi
ce
 v
er
sa
.
 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 d
eg
re
es
 o
f p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
co
ns
tra
in
t/f
re
ed
om
, b
ei
ng
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 b
y 
re
go
le
 in
 v
ar
io
us
 w
ay
s (
e.g
. te
rri
tor
ial
 de
ve
lop
me
nt 
po
lic
ie
s t
o 
be
 a
pp
lie
d 
on
 c
om
m
on
 la
nd
s; 
co
m
pu
lso
ry
 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
-re
go
la
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s o
n 
lo
ca
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
re
di
ct
ed
 b
y 
la
w
).
 
M
c,
 (O
Eq
)
Conflict or synergy? 11
K
ey
 a
sp
ec
ts
Su
b-
ke
y 
as
pe
ct
s
 
R
at
io
na
le
 
Fo
rm
at
 o
f q
ue
sti
on
s
D
ep
en
de
nc
e 
of
 m
un
ic
ip
al
 p
ol
ic
y 
pr
oc
es
se
s o
n 
in
te
rn
al
 
re
go
la
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s.
 
M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 m
ay
 n
ee
d 
ap
pr
ov
al
 b
y 
re
go
le
 fo
r 
po
lic
ie
s o
n 
te
rri
to
ria
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t t
o 
be
 a
pp
lie
d 
o
n
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 la
nd
s (
e.g
. b
uil
din
g o
f n
ew
 fa
cil
itie
s 
fo
r w
in
te
r t
ou
ris
m
). D
isc
us
sio
ns
 w
ill 
be
 lik
ely
 
pr
oc
es
se
d 
by
 re
go
le
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s. 
It 
is 
to
 b
e 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
ed
 w
he
th
er
,
 
ho
w
 a
nd
 to
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t, 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
re
go
la
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s i
m
pa
ct
 o
n 
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 d
ec
isi
on
s.
 
O
Eq
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 a
ct
ua
l a
nd
 p
ot
en
tia
l m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
-re
go
la
 
co
o
rd
in
at
io
n,
 in
 te
rm
s o
f o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s a
nd
 th
re
at
s.
 
So
m
e 
str
at
eg
ic
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
sp
on
se
s w
er
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
w
ith
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 th
e 
ac
tu
al
 si
tu
at
io
n.
 O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 o
n 
po
te
nt
ia
l s
itu
at
io
n 
w
er
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 m
iti
ga
te
 fo
rm
er
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
an
sw
er
s, 
th
ou
gh
 so
m
e 
de
gr
ee
s o
f i
de
al
iz
at
io
n 
o
f t
he
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
m
ay
 b
e 
re
ve
al
ed
 a
s w
el
l.
 
M
c,
 L
s
O
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s a
nd
 
th
re
at
s: 
O
Eq
3.
 C
irc
um
sta
nc
es
 
o
f a
ct
iv
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
-
R
eg
ol
a 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
Pr
oje
cts
, a
cti
vit
ies
, a
cti
on
s t
ha
t m
un
ici
pa
liti
es 
pr
oa
ct
iv
el
y 
in
vo
lv
ed
 re
go
le
 fo
r, 
an
d 
v
ic
e 
ve
rs
a,
 
co
n
ce
rn
in
g 
(i)
 ur
ba
n d
ev
elo
pm
en
t a
nd
 te
rri
tor
ial
 
st
ra
te
gi
es
; (
ii)
 ec
on
om
ic 
de
ve
lop
me
nt;
 (i
ii)
 fo
res
t 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
(iv
) s
oc
ial
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t.
 
Se
le
ct
io
n 
of
 re
le
va
nt
 a
re
as
 o
f i
nt
er
es
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
dr
iv
en
 b
y 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s t
ha
t t
he
 re
gi
on
al
 la
w
 c
al
l 
u
po
n 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 a
nd
 re
go
le
 w
ith
, a
lso
 in
 te
rm
s 
o
f m
ut
ua
l c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
– 
bu
t t
he
 ra
ng
e 
of
 p
os
sib
le
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 sp
an
s b
ey
on
d 
th
e 
str
ic
t l
eg
al
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s. 
Ye
s/N
o
If 
an
y:
 O
Eq
, M
c
If 
no
: M
c,
 (O
Eq
)
Fi
el
ds
 o
f m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
-re
go
la
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n,
 o
th
er
s 
th
an
 th
os
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 id
en
tifi
ed
; i
nv
es
tig
at
io
n 
on
 
w
he
th
er
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 m
an
ag
e 
as
se
ts
 o
f t
he
 re
go
le
 
th
ro
ug
h 
pa
rti
cu
la
r a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 a
nd
/o
r m
an
da
te
s, 
an
d 
vi
ce
 v
er
sa
.
 
M
un
ic
ip
al
ity
-re
go
la
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
, p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
s, 
co
o
rd
in
at
io
n 
m
ay
 o
cc
ur
 o
n 
ar
ea
s a
nd
 fi
el
ds
 o
f i
nt
er
es
t 
o
th
er
 th
an
 th
os
e 
ex
pl
ic
itl
y 
re
ca
lle
d 
by
 th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 
la
w.
 
O
Eq
Ta
bl
e 
1 
(co
nti
nu
ed
)
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K
ey
 a
sp
ec
ts
Su
b-
ke
y 
as
pe
ct
s
 
R
at
io
na
le
 
Fo
rm
at
 o
f q
ue
sti
on
s
4.
 F
in
an
ci
al
 
ef
fe
ct
s o
n 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
ts 
du
e 
to
 
re
co
n
st
itu
tio
n 
of
 
re
go
le
.
Ca
us
es
, m
ag
ni
tu
de
, a
nd
 p
at
te
rn
s (
po
sit
ive
 
o
r 
n
eg
at
iv
e,
 d
ire
ct
 o
r i
nd
ire
ct
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s, 
co
n
tin
uo
us
 o
r u
n
a
 ta
nt
um
 
ef
fe
ct
s) 
of
 im
pa
cts
 on
 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
he
et
s, 
if 
an
y,
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
lo
ca
l 
re
co
n
st
itu
tio
ns
 o
f r
eg
ol
e.
 
Re
le
va
nt
 ch
an
ge
s i
n 
te
nu
re
 ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts 
an
d 
la
nd
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 co
m
e w
ith
 re
co
ns
tit
ut
io
n 
of
 re
go
le
, w
ith
 
v
al
ua
bl
e s
hi
fts
 in
 co
lle
ct
io
n 
of
 fo
re
str
y-
re
la
te
d 
re
v
en
u
es
. T
hi
s m
ay
 h
av
e a
ffe
ct
ed
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 
ba
la
nc
e s
he
et
s, 
re
su
lti
ng
 in
 o
pe
ra
tiv
e l
im
ita
tio
ns
 fo
r 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
iti
es
.
 
M
c
H
ow
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 re
ac
te
d 
– 
re
sil
ie
nt
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s, 
o
r 
su
ffe
rin
g 
pe
rm
an
en
t c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s –
 to
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
im
pa
ct
s (
if 
an
y) 
fol
low
ing
 re
co
ns
titu
tio
n o
f l
oc
al 
re
go
la
, a
nd
 w
he
th
er
 su
ch
 a
da
pt
iv
e 
ac
tio
ns
 h
ad
 a
ny
 
im
pa
ct
s o
n 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 m
un
ic
ip
al
 c
om
m
un
ity
.
 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s:
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 fi
na
nc
ia
l i
m
pa
ct
s, 
an
d 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 a
da
pt
at
io
ns
, m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
in
di
re
ct
ly
 
im
pa
ct
ed
 o
n 
lo
ca
l c
om
m
un
iti
es
, e
ith
er
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 
(e.
g. 
rat
ion
ali
za
tio
n o
f p
ub
lic
 ex
pe
nd
itu
res
) o
r 
n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
(e.
g. 
hig
he
r t
ax
 pr
ess
ure
, lo
we
r s
oc
ial
 
ai
ds
, e
tc
.).
 
O
Eq
A
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f f
or
m
er
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 re
in
ve
stm
en
t r
at
es
 
o
f t
im
be
r-s
el
lin
g 
re
ve
nu
es
 in
 m
un
ic
ip
al
 fo
re
st 
as
se
ts,
 
pr
io
r t
o 
re
co
ns
tit
ut
ui
on
 o
f r
eg
ol
e.
 
It 
is 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 th
at
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 m
os
tly
 li
m
ite
d 
re
in
ve
stm
en
t r
at
es
 to
 th
e 
m
in
im
um
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
de
fin
ed
 
by
 la
w,
 
i.e
. 1
0%
 o
f t
im
be
r-s
el
lin
g 
re
ve
nu
es
.
 
M
c
5.
 O
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
o
f m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
-
R
eg
ol
a 
le
ga
l 
di
sp
ut
es
 a
nd
/
o
r 
in
sti
tu
tio
na
l 
te
ns
io
ns
/
co
n
tr
as
ts
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
of
 re
go
la
-m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 le
ga
l d
isp
ut
es
, 
m
ai
nl
y 
bu
t n
ot
 so
le
ly
 re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
pr
op
er
ty
 ri
gh
ts 
ov
er
 so
m
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
r a
ss
et
s, 
ei
th
er
 
in
 th
e 
pa
st 
or
 st
ill
 in
 p
la
ce
. T
rig
ge
rin
g 
re
as
on
s 
an
d 
fo
re
se
ea
bl
e 
ev
ol
ut
io
ns
/so
lu
tio
ns
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
in
ve
sti
ga
te
d 
as
 w
el
l.
 
Le
ga
l d
isp
ut
es
 m
ay
 c
om
pr
om
ise
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
o
f b
ot
h 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 a
nd
 re
go
le
 in
 m
an
ag
in
g 
fo
re
st 
la
nd
sc
ap
es
 a
nd
 so
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
 lo
ca
l r
es
ou
rc
es
, a
s 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
an
d 
ec
on
om
ic
 e
ne
rg
ie
s a
re
 d
iss
ip
at
ed
 
in
 su
ch
 c
on
fli
ct
s.
 
Ye
s/N
o
If 
an
y:
 M
c,
 O
Eq
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
of
 re
go
la
-m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 in
sti
tu
tio
na
l 
te
ns
io
ns
, m
ai
nl
y 
bu
t n
ot
 so
le
ly
 li
nk
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
(an
d p
oli
cy
-m
ak
ing
) 
co
m
pe
te
nc
es
 o
ve
r s
om
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
r a
ss
et
s, 
ei
th
er
 in
 th
e 
pa
st 
or
 st
ill
 in
 p
la
ce
. T
rig
ge
rin
g 
re
as
on
s, 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 
o
f s
uc
h 
co
nt
ra
sts
 a
nd
 fo
re
se
ea
bl
e 
ev
ol
ut
io
ns
/so
lu
tio
ns
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
in
ve
sti
ga
te
d 
as
 w
el
l.
 
Ev
en
 th
ou
gh
 le
ss
 to
ug
h 
th
an
 le
ga
l d
isp
ut
es
, 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
co
nfl
ic
ts 
an
d 
in
sti
tu
tio
na
l t
en
sio
ns
 m
ay
 
o
bs
ta
cl
e 
a 
fru
itf
ul
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 
an
d 
re
go
le
, e
ve
n 
be
yo
nd
 th
e 
te
rm
s o
f t
he
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
iss
ue
s u
nd
er
 d
isc
us
sio
n.
 
M
c,
 L
s, 
O
Eq
Ta
bl
e 
1 
(co
nti
nu
ed
)
Conflict or synergy? 13
K
ey
 a
sp
ec
ts
Su
b-
ke
y 
as
pe
ct
s
 
R
at
io
na
le
 
Fo
rm
at
 o
f q
ue
sti
on
s
6.
 O
cc
ur
re
nc
e o
f 
so
ci
al
 c
on
fli
ct
s, 
ei
th
er
 d
ire
ct
ly
 
o
r 
in
di
re
ct
ly
 
tr
ig
ge
re
d 
by
 
re
go
le
, w
ith
in
 
th
e 
m
un
ic
ip
al
 
co
m
m
u
n
iti
es
.
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e,
 re
as
on
s; 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f a
ny
 so
ci
al
 is
su
es
 
lin
ke
d 
w
ith
 re
go
le
, e
ith
er
 in
 th
e 
pa
st 
or
 st
ill
 in
 p
la
ce
 –
 
in
 th
is 
ca
se
, f
or
es
ee
ab
le
 e
vo
lu
tio
n.
 
So
ci
al
 te
ns
io
ns
 m
ay
 b
e 
tri
gg
er
ed
 b
y 
cl
ai
m
s 
o
v
er
 r
es
o
u
rc
es
 a
n
d 
rig
ht
s b
y 
no
n-
rig
ht
-h
ol
de
rs
, 
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n 
of
 n
on
-ri
gh
t-h
ol
de
rs
 b
y 
co
m
m
on
er
s 
an
d/
or
 n
o 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 o
f n
ew
 ri
gh
t-h
ol
de
rs
, e
tc
. 
N
es
te
dn
es
s o
f l
oc
al
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
 (o
ve
rla
pp
ing
 
be
tw
ee
n 
re
go
la
 a
nd
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 c
om
m
un
ity
) i
s o
f 
pa
rti
cu
la
r i
nt
er
es
t h
er
e.
 
M
c,
 L
s, 
O
Eq
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 w
he
th
er
 b
en
efi
ts 
fro
m
 c
om
m
on
 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
an
d/
or
 e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n 
of
 re
go
la
 la
nd
s a
re
 
sh
ar
ed
 a
m
on
g 
rig
ht
-h
ol
de
rs
 o
nl
y, 
o
r 
th
ey
 a
re
 so
m
eh
ow
 
sh
ar
ed
/e
xt
en
de
d 
w
ith
/to
 n
on
-ri
gh
ts-
ho
ld
er
s a
s w
el
l.
 
Th
e 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
of
 n
on
-r
ig
ht
-h
ol
de
rs
 fr
om
 so
m
e 
be
ne
fit
s w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 b
e 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
m
os
t 
co
n
te
nt
io
us
 is
su
es
 p
os
si
bl
y 
tri
gg
er
in
g 
so
ci
al
 
co
n
fli
ct
s (
i.e
. im
pa
ir 
we
lfa
re 
co
nd
iti
on
s w
ith
in 
the
 
sa
m
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
,
 
du
e 
to
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
pr
iv
ile
ge
s 
tie
d 
to
 a
nc
ie
nt
 ri
gh
ts
 p
as
se
d 
on
 o
nl
y 
th
ro
ug
h 
in
he
rit
an
ce
). 
It 
als
o a
cts
 as
 a 
go
od
 in
dic
ato
r o
f 
re
go
le
’s
 o
pe
nn
es
s 
to
w
ar
d 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 p
re
ss
ur
es
 fo
r 
so
ci
al
 c
ha
ng
e.
 
M
c
If 
an
y:
 O
Eq
Ex
pl
or
at
io
n 
of
 w
he
th
er
 a
nd
 h
ow
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 h
av
e 
ev
er
 b
ee
n 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
re
go
la
 in
te
rn
al
 li
fe 
an
d 
re
go
la
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s.
 
So
m
e 
re
go
le
 m
ay
 lo
ok
 fo
r m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t/s
ug
ge
st
io
ns
 o
n 
th
ei
r i
nt
er
na
l l
ife
, 
la
to
 se
ns
u.
 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e,
 re
go
le
 m
ig
ht
 w
an
t t
o 
co
o
rd
in
at
e 
th
ei
r s
oc
ia
l a
im
s a
nd
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 w
ith
 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 so
 a
s t
o 
ba
la
nc
e 
so
ci
al
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 
o
f r
ig
ht
-h
ol
de
rs
 a
nd
 n
on
-r
ig
ht
-h
ol
de
rs
 li
vi
ng
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
.
 
M
c
If 
an
y:
 O
Eq
Po
sit
iv
e 
an
d 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
op
in
io
ns
/re
m
ar
ks
 b
y 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
es
 o
n 
re
go
la
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 
an
d 
re
go
la
 in
te
gr
at
io
n 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
lo
ca
l s
oc
ia
l 
en
v
iro
nm
en
t(s
), a
s p
erc
eiv
ed
 by
 no
n-r
igh
t-h
old
ers
.
 
Qu
est
ion
 di
rec
tly
 co
nn
ec
ted
 to
 th
e p
rev
iou
s o
ne
s.
 
Ls
, O
Eq
Ta
bl
e 
1 
(co
nti
nu
ed
)
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R
at
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7.
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f 
lo
ca
l r
eg
ol
e’
s 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
M
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 o
pi
ni
on
 o
n 
re
go
la
 in
sti
tu
tio
na
l c
ap
ac
ity
/
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
(i)
 fo
res
t m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l c
on
se
rv
at
io
n;
 (i
i) 
ec
on
om
ic 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t; 
(ii
i) 
tou
ris
m 
pro
mo
tio
n; 
(iv
) s
oc
ial
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t.
 
H
er
e,
 fo
cu
s i
s o
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t b
y 
re
go
le
 
o
n
ly
.
 
M
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
s h
av
e 
be
en
 a
sk
ed
 to
 
in
di
ca
te
/d
es
cr
ib
e 
re
go
la
 a
ct
io
ns
, t
o 
ra
te
 th
e 
re
go
la
 
co
m
m
itm
en
t (
ca
pa
cit
y, 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s) 
an
d j
ust
ify
 th
eir
 
o
pi
ni
on
s s
tre
ss
in
g 
re
go
la
 st
re
ng
th
s a
nd
 w
ea
kn
es
se
s.
 
Ex
pl
or
at
io
n:
 O
Eq
, 
SS
a 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n:
 L
s, 
M
c,
 
(O
Eq
)
8.
 F
ur
th
er
 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
ity
 
o
pi
ni
on
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
Po
ss
ib
le
 so
lu
tio
ns
 to
 st
re
ng
th
en
 th
e 
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
-
re
go
la
 in
sti
tu
tio
na
l c
oo
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3.2. Data collection: sampling and procedures
Between Spring and Summer 2013, we administered a questionnaire to all 17 
municipalities having one or more regole within their administrative jurisdic-
tion (Figure 1). Three municipalities did not give permission for us to carry out 
the survey, leaving us with data on 14 municipalities (82.4% response rate). The 
investigated municipalities comprised 37 regole out of the 53 regole existing in 
the Veneto Region (69.8% coverage of regole). In our sample, the mean number 
of regole inside each municipality is 2.5, ranging from 1 regola in three cases 
(21.4%) to 5 regole in one case (7.1%) with the majority of municipalities having 
2 regole within their administrative borders.
A structured questionnaire with both closed- and open-ended response types 
was used. Close-ended questions required either Yes/No, single or multiple 
choice answers, or value judgments on a Likert scale. Probing questions were 
occasionally used where outcomes of open-ended responses needed further 
exploration.
In order to solicit participation, each municipality’s secretariat was reached by 
phone and email. During this phase, the research objectives and methodology were 
presented and availability for a face-to-face interview was ascertained. Informants 
were chosen based on a purposive sampling strategy, aimed at selecting the munici-
pality’s officers most responsible for – or well informed about – the range of formal 
and informal relationships between municipalities and regole. The final set of infor-
mants included individuals with different roles in the municipalities: ten mayors, 
two council members, a municipal secretary and an office manager. All interviews 
were carried out by the same researcher with the assistance of a student research 
assistant. Interviews lasted 1–1.5 h, during which informants were encouraged to 
highlight causes and motivations and to provide explanations of their statements. 
As such, narrative responses were sought to supplement closed-ended interview 
questions.
Interview audio was not recorded, as it was felt that this might have hindered 
respondents from answering freely. In order to limit the likelihood of strategic 
responses, interviewees were given assurances that all information collected 
would be processed in an aggregated form to mask identity.
The data collected were input into a database and simple percentage distri-
butions were calculated for single and multiple choice responses. Judgments 
expressed on a numerical Likert-scale, e.g. those concerning severity of tensions 
and conflicts with regole, were later translated into qualitative terms, making use 
of terms such as “negligible”, “weak”, “reasonable” and “severe”.
4. Results and discussion
Questionnaire data on the relationship between municipalities and regole are 
interpreted in Table 2 and key results are discussed in detail below.
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Table 2. Results summary.
Key-aspects  Main results from interview data
1. Coordination 
mechanisms and 
patterns
 −	 Almost all regole were represented in the local town council: 
often councilors, aldermen, and even mayors were also right-
holders in regole.
−	 Full overlap in institutional responsibilities, with representation of 
a single person on both town council and an administrative board 
of a regola is rare, partly due to statutory limitations.
−	 In most cases, the mayor held the main institutional ties with 
local regole. Similarly, usually presidents of regole played an 
analogous role. 
−	 Multiple institutional ties between individuals of both institutions 
were rare: commonly, institutional coordination did not originate 
out of a collective effort.
−	 Usually, informal arrangements between institutions paved 
the way for formal decisions. Highly formalized relationships 
between municipalities and regole were rare.
−	 Total lack of municipality-regola coordination was rare. Either 
coordination patterns B, C, and B+C (see Figure 2) were 
common.
−	 More stable institutional coordination mechanisms were seen as 
worth implementing.
2. Mutual 
administrative 
constraints
 −	 Municipality-regola consultation initiated either by municipalities 
or regole.
−	 Qualitative differences in municipality-regola interaction: 
regole mainly asking for cooperation to solve administrative and 
bureaucratic issues, whereas municipalities mainly looking to 
involve regole in proposals and projects to be applied on common 
lands.
−	 Usually, municipality representatives did not perceive their 
administrative roles to be seriously constrained on land restitution 
to regole. Main constraints related to the implementation of 
territorial strategies on the property of the regole.
−	 Positive and negative evaluations were balanced on actual and 
potential coordination, in terms of opportunities and threats. 
Nonetheless, the current situation was generally judged less 
positively than potential scenarios of coordination.
−	 Regole able to strongly influence local politics, policy processes 
and decisions.
−	 Municipalities never involved in internal dynamics and 
governance mechanisms of regole.
3. Circumstances of 
active municipality-
regola interaction
 −	 High levels of municipality-regola coordination on matters 
concerning environmental management and conservation. 
Particularly, in relation to maintenance and building of local 
forest road networks (joint application to Rural Development 
Plan (RDP) funding possibilities), and local hydroelectric power 
plants, less for urban development and social events.
−	 Often, multi-year and long-term strategic plans considerd 
municipality-regola cooperation on local economic development 
matters. 
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Key-aspects  Main results from interview data
−	 In compliance with regional policy prescription, municipalities 
often involved regole in projects or plans concerning urban 
and territorial development. Many other minor and/or local 
circumstances for municipality-regola cooperation have been 
found on the ground.
−	 Promotion of local culture and traditions seemed to be the 
weakest field of municipality-regola interaction, as often regole 
carried out many activities (e.g. cultural, gastronomic and 
religious initiatives) autonomously.
−	 Municipalities did not manage common assets through ad hoc 
mandate, and vice versa.
4. Financial effects 
on municipality 
balance sheets due to 
reconstitution of regole
 −	 Impacts on municipality financial balance sheets due to 
reconstitution of regole ranged from 50,000 to 200,000 €/year/
municipality.
−	 Fewer negative effects on municipal balance sheets than expected: 
rarely severe shortages of municipal capital resources.
−	 Often, no relevant consequences for the community as a whole 
in terms of number/quality of services provided by municipality 
administrations.
5. Occurrence of 
municipality-regola 
legal disputes and/or 
institutional tensions/
contrasts
 −	 Size and quality of some forest assets returned to regole have 
sparked legal disputes with municipalities on tenure rights, often 
triggered by cadastral inaccuracies.
−	 Recently, some pending legal issues were resolved with 
corresponding improvement of relationships.
−	 Other institutional tensions exist, mainly concerning the 
allocation of institutional competencies, e.g. duty/right to issue 
access permits for forest roads.
−	 Regole not always inclined to recognize the administrative role 
played by municipalities in their area.
6. Occurrence of social 
conflicts, either directly 
or indirectly triggered 
by regole, within the 
municipal communities.
 −	 Social conflicts linked with nestedness of regole within 
municipalities are more frequent and severe compared to 
institutional ones, possibly undermining the social cohesion 
within the local community.
−	 Several reasons were provided for occurrence of social conflicts, 
including: (i) difficulty in being accepted as members of regole 
for those who are not descendants of local right-holders; (ii) the 
hostile attitude of some members of regole towards outsiders; 
(iii) male-dominated gender balance within regole; (iv) 
exclusion of non-members from enjoyment of some resource 
benefits.
−	 It seems non-right-holders perceive regole as rather poorly, or not 
at all integrated, into the local, social environment.
7. Municipality 
assessment of local 
Regole’s effectiveness 
 −	 From most positive to most negative evaluations, as follows 
−	 Forest management and environmental conservation. Pro: Forest 
management as one of regole’s core areas, higher reinvestment 
rates in forest management compared to former municipal levels. 
Cons: traditional mentality precluding development of alternative 
forest-based enterprises and activities.
Table 2. (Continued)
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Key-aspects  Main results from interview data
−	 Economic development. Pro: increase in timber prices and 
revenues, establishment of new local forest enterprises, 
application to RDP funding to maintain and further develop 
the forest road networks. Cons: “ordinary management”, rather 
than introducing innovative management options, reluctance to 
innovate by some regole.
−	 Tourism development. Pro: some regole directly involved in 
managing local ski facilities, renewed attention by regole toward 
pasture management, refurbishment of traditional alpine huts in 
modern agro-tourist buildings. Cons: some right-holders not in 
favor of supplying “new” complementary goods and services 
(incl. recreational services), hostile attitude toward non-rights 
holders.
−	 Social development. Pro: joint municipality-regola welfare 
opportunities. Cons: difficulties for non-right holders in being 
accepted as new members of regole, hostile attitude towards 
outsiders, male-dominated gender balance, exclusion of non-
members from the possibility of enjoying some resource benefits, 
regole should commit themselves to more actively support 
municipalities in their welfare strategies.
4.1. Coordination mechanisms and patterns
Exploration of coordination mechanisms and patterns provided results pertaining 
to the strength, stability and nestedness of institutional interaction between munic-
ipalities and regole. Several aspects were considered in this regard, as reported 
in Table 1. To start with, we assessed how many persons on the municipalities 
side had the formal role of communicating/coordinating actions with regole, and 
what were their institutional position(s). We found that, in 42.9% of municipali-
ties (six cases), the interface role was carried out by only one person: in five of 
these cases this person was the town mayor, the deputy mayor in the sixth case. 
In 29.5% of cases more persons were involved, as the deputy mayor or a council 
member reinforce the mayor’s role. Only in the remaining 21.4% of cases the 
institutional coordination is a real group effort, involving the entire town coun-
cil. In our understanding, interactions dependent upon the action of one or a few 
persons – who could change with the ordinary turnover in local  administrations – 
should be read as an indication of weaker and less mature relationships. On the 
other hand, empowerment to the highest positions in municipalities, such as the 
mayor or the deputy mayor, signals the importance attributed by municipalities to 
coordinating with regole.
A second aspect explored focused on the possible overlapping of roles 
between municipalities and regole: we assessed to what extent a person with an 
institutional role in municipalities would also belong to the regole. In all sur-
veyed cases, at least one person with an institutional position in the municipality 
was also found to be a member of a local regola. In 64.2%, 22.4% and 14.2% of 
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cases, respectively, this person was the town mayor, an alderman3, or a town coun-
cilman. From the perspective of the outcomes on the ground, this overlap in roles 
appeared to represent a strength, as it facilitated mutual exchange of information 
and smoothed complex decision-making processes. However, it may carry a risk 
of conflicting interests, especially when a formal role is held in both institutions 
by a single person. In our case this was not frequent (only two cases were found 
where the president or a member of the board of directors of a regola also held 
a political role in the municipality): this can be explained with the fact that the 
regole, in general, are well aware of this risk, and some explicitly forbid dual roles 
through specific constitutional provisions.
Municipality representatives were also asked to indicate whether sharing of 
ideas, projects and strategies between them and regole occurred in a formal or 
informal fashion. Only in two cases (14.3%), relationships were characterized by 
high levels of formality, in which parties called for official written documents to 
provide evidence of meetings, proposals and mutual requests. According to the 
interviewees, such cases were linked to significant levels of tension between the 
two parties, and indicated lack of mutual trust. In two other cases (14.3%) only 
informal relationships prevail, as municipality’s representatives stated they felt 
no need for formality. In one case, informality proved to underlie a lack of insti-
tutional interlinkages. In all other cases, interviewees claimed that preliminary 
informal arrangements usually prepared the way for formal decisions, following 
a balanced and constructive approach to develop good and stable relationships.
Finally, we focused on understanding the more general patterns of commu-
nication and coordination between municipalities and regole. We used four dif-
ferent schema to synthesize the situation of our case studies (A, B, C and B+C in 
Figure 2). In three cases (21.4%), municipality representatives perceived inter-
mittent and weak institutional linkages, describing a substantial lack of coordina-
tion with regole, although in this case, collaboration may occur amongst regole 
located within a municipality (Pattern A). In five cases (35.7%), municipality rep-
resentatives declare the existence of well-established institutional linkages, but 
occurring only individually between the municipality and each regola (Pattern B). 
In one case, local regole first coordinated their actions amongst themselves, then 
interacted with the municipality in order to be more effective (Pattern C). Finally, 
in five other cases (35.7%), regole coordinated amongst themselves before talking 
to municipalities but also kept bilateral and multilateral interactions depending on 
the scale of the issues under discussion (Pattern B+C). Nesting strategies repre-
sented by C or B+C schema show more durable and involved institutional coordi-
nation. These later strategies were also advocated by municipality’s  representatives, 
3
 In Italy, municipal aldermen are members of the Executive Board that oversees the main adminis-
trative and policy matters. Under certain conditions, the Town Council accepts, integrates or rejects 
policies undertaken by the Executive Board. Whereas the aldermen are directly nominated by the 
Major, councilmen – that constitute the town Council – need to be democratically elected. Thus, a 
single person might simultaneously cover the role of councilman (elected) and alderman (nominated).
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especially for local territorial development where sharing of ideas, solutions and 
experiences both between municipalities and regole, and among regole was per-
ceived as crucial.
4.2. Modes of consultation processes and related difficulties
Consultations between municipalities and regole can occur for different reasons 
and can be initiated either by municipalities or regole. According to the Regional 
Law, municipalities must consult regole when relevant territorial management 
decisions are at stake, such as approval of town planning acts. In other fields of 
planning and management, the Law only recommends holding consultations (see 
also next section on this). Consultations can be initiated either by municipalities 
or by regole. In six of our cases (42.9%) interactions were initiated by munici-
palities, while the opposite took place only in one case (7.1%). In the remaining 
50.0% of cases, a balanced or irregular situation was reported in which both insti-
tutions were found to have initiated consultation with the other.
Municipalities turned to regole for obtaining their agreement on proposals and 
projects of local development requiring the use of regole-owned land, especially 
when transfer of ownership of the land back to the regole was recent. Regole, on 
the other hand, asked for cooperation mainly for administrative and bureaucratic 
issues, for example when they needed to be granted authorization for restoring 
alpine huts and converting them in agro-tourism facilities.
When asked to report on their perception of the difficulties connected with 
the consultation process, the majority of respondents declared negligible admin-
istrative burdens and weak constrains linked to the compliance with the legal 
requirement (Figure 3). Instead, municipalities stated that they encounter strong 
difficulties in interacting with regole beyond the legal requirements, especially 
Regola
A B C
Regola Regola Regola
Regola
Regola Regola
Regola
Regola
Regola
Munici-
pality
Munici-
pality
Munici-
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RegolaRegola
Figure 2: The coordination patterns possibly occurring between municipalities and regole 
within municipal boundaries. Pattern A: rare or weak institutional linkages between municipal-
ity and regole, regardless of the degree of cooperation among different regole; Pattern B: well-
established institutional linkages between municipality and each single local regole; Pattern C: 
regole fully coordinating their representation in their relationship with the municipality. Case 
B+C exists as well in cases in which regole cooperate together with the municipality in addition 
to cooperating individually with the municipality.
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when wider territorial development strategies and related actions needed to be 
decided upon (including various initiatives in rural tourism as reported in more 
detail below). These almost inevitably refer to land only recently returned under 
the full control of regole’s members, a smaller community in respect to the munic-
ipality as a whole, often with different objectives and independent internal gov-
ernance mechanisms.
4.3. Fields of institutional interaction
The Regional Law recommends that municipalities and regole interact in a wide 
range of initiatives, projects and activities in different fields, including environ-
mental management and conservation, local economic development, urban and 
territorial management and development, and promotion of local culture and tra-
ditions. Through this section of the survey we focused on understanding whether 
collaboration works more effectively in some fields of activity than in others.
(i) Environmental management and conservation. High levels of coop-
eration were found between municipalities and regole when dealing with 
forest management and environmental conservation. In this field, initia-
tive was often taken by regole promoting joint projects, frequently co-
funded by municipalities. Only in two cases (14.3%), regole acted fully 
independently from municipalities. Construction of new forest roads and 
maintenance of existing ones were the most frequent subject of discus-
sion (eight cases, 57.1%), followed by initiatives of joint application 
to RDP funding (five cases, 35.7%), maintenance of existing buildings 
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Figure 3: The regional law prescribes compulsory mechanisms of mutual administrative and 
policy interfacing between municipalities and regole, especially with regards to some particu-
lar policies concerning relevant territorial management decisions. It is shown to what extent 
municipalities rate these obliged relationships as constraining in administrative and policy 
terms.
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(e.g. pasture huts), mowing of pasture land and controlling tree expan-
sion on pasture land (five cases, 35.7%). In three cases (21.4%), forest 
owned by the municipalities and by regole were managed together under 
a common forest management plan, and in two of these cases, the two 
parties even stipulated agreements for jointly employing forest guards. 
All these actions are considered to be important in mountain areas for 
supporting forest activities, unifying landscape management under com-
mon objectives, countering land and forest abandonment, and ultimately 
ensuring sustainable environmental management.
(ii) Local development. In this field, we counted four cases of interaction 
(28.6%) linked to projects for ski area development. Municipalities and 
regole were found to have disagreed on the final decision only in one 
case. Two other cases (14.3%) were connected to management of exist-
ing ski facilities. In eight cases (57.1%) discussions focused on whether 
to establish small hydroelectric power plants, an issue that is highly con-
tentious in mountain areas of the Veneto Region at the moment. In four of 
these cases (28.6%) municipalities and Regole agreed on implementing 
the hydro project, while in a fifth case (7.1%) the preliminary project 
has been approved. In three other cases (21.4%), regole and municipali-
ties successfully cooperated to impede the construction of an unwanted 
plant, collectively perceived as detrimental to the local environment. The 
possibility of building energy plants using local biomass was often dis-
cussed but never thus far implemented. In two cases (14.3%), municipali-
ties promoted initiatives for a stable partnership among municipalities, 
regole, other local associations and private businesses. One initiative 
aimed at common management of local forests and joint forest certifica-
tion, the other at improving local services and facilities for tourists. Only 
one respondent reported a total absence of cooperation with regole on 
local development matters.
(iii) Urban and territorial management and development. Strategies and 
activities aimed at local economic development at a municipal scale are 
carried out by municipal administrations through “Ten-year Plans for 
Future Urban and Territorial Development”. Following guidance of the 
regional law, administrations activate participatory processes to consult 
regole prior to plan approval. In addition to this fundamental role, in 
five cases (35.7%), regole also co-fund maintenance and improvement of 
urban decor, including major activities like restoration of public spaces 
or re-paving the town square, along with minor ones such as provid-
ing the town’s Christmas trees. Lack of cooperation in the field of urban 
planning was reported in only one case (7.1%).
(iv) Promotion of local culture and customs. This proved to be the weak-
est area of interaction but it was probably also less critical in terms ter-
ritorial development. In three cases (21.4%) no relationships were found 
to have been built in this area within the last 5 years, whereas in seven 
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cases (50%) regole and municipalities cooperated only for minor events. 
In about 30% of the cases, cooperation was more active under diverse 
circumstances, ranging from the joint management of visitor centers to 
the promotion of the local dialect and the co-funding of school build-
ing maintenance. Nevertheless, according respondents in municipal 
administrations, regole often operate autonomously, promoting cultural, 
gastronomic and religious initiatives, particularly carnival and cultural 
events and initiatives for disseminating local traditions and knowledge of 
regole.
The results show that, despite some problems and difficulties, municipalities and 
regole collaborate on a wide range of initiatives, some of which are strategic for 
the rural environment and landscape, like forest management, environmental con-
servation, and investments in renewable energy.
4.4. Financial impacts of land restitution
Restitution of land to regole implies that revenues from the sale of timber, lease 
of pastures and alpine huts, and concessions for quarry sites and ski areas are now 
earned by regole and no longer flow to municipalities. According to our survey, 
these revenues are significant, averaging around 200,000 €/year per case, with 
extremes ranging from about 50,000 to 700,000 €/year depending on the size and 
quality of resources. Although we were expecting negative impacts on the services 
provided by municipalities because of this loss, interviewees provided a different 
perspective. In four cases (28.6%), representatives of administrations claim that no 
relevant changes have occurred in the services provided to citizens, explaining that 
the municipal budgets were robust enough to cope with lower revenues, and the 
necessary financial resources have simply been drawn from other non-essential bal-
ance items. In three cases (21.4%) they argued that lower incomes were paralleled 
by lower annual expenditures, again without serious consequences. In four other 
cases (28.6%), the municipalities had never received any financial benefits from for-
est ownership, thus no economic shortcomings were felt following the reconstitu-
tion process. Only two interviewees (14.3%) stated that municipalities had suffered 
a severe shortage of financial resources, and this had led to a lower level of services, 
higher tax pressure on citizens and even to the need to lay off a municipal worker.
4.5. Occurrence, frequency and severity of legal disputes and institutional 
tensions
Although major disputes were generally averted, in some cases the size and qual-
ity of the forest assets led to legal disputes on distribution of rights, often trig-
gered by inaccurate cadastral records. The frequency of such disputes is reported 
in Figure 4. In seven cases (50%), no legal disputes had arisen, whereas in three 
cases (21.4%) they occurred but had been resolved. In the four remaining cases 
(28.6%), disputes had not yet been resolved.
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In addition to legal disputes, minor tensions may arise between municipali-
ties and regole, due mostly to disagreements on how responsibilities should be 
distributed, or divergence on their reciprocal roles. Figure 4 shows that tensions 
have been detected in six cases (42.9%), the majority of which were considered 
moderately serious (Figure 5). Municipal representatives argued that tensions 
arise because of a “dominant attitude” displayed by some regole that are not will-
ing to recognize the role of municipalities as a local authority. A typical example 
of these tensions relates to motor vehicle access to forest roads, which is pos-
sible with a permit issued only by the local authority – i.e. a municipal author-
ity. Since forest roads often cross regola-owned lands, regole claim the right to 
decide autonomously who should or should not be granted an access permit in 
such cases. Institutional tensions were significantly more frequent than legal dis-
putes, however, and there was no need for courts to resolve litigation in these 
cases. Generally, a small amount of help from legal professionals was enough to 
reach friendly agreements.
Our data show that, although conflicts and disagreements did arise, most of 
the time they were not severe and ultimately a solution was found. Noticeably, 
municipal representatives highlighted that, in most situations, both parties took a 
constructive approach to such conflicts, displaying willingness to reach friendly 
agreements. Municipalities pointed out that the resolution of legal issues often 
turns out to be a chance for final clarifications and definitive resolution of ongoing 
conflicts. Thus, there was a feeling that future relationships had been improved 
through engagement on such issues. This was an interesting outcome, especially 
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Figure 4: Occurrence (%) of either past and current legal disputes between municipalities and 
regole (often due to controversies regarding ownership rights over valuable natural assets), as 
well as of other less serious institutional tensions (mainly concerning the distribution of insti-
tutional areas of competence). Occurrence of social tensions due to the existence of regole and 
their relationships with broader communities of local inhabitants are also shown.
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when compared with examples from other parts of the Veneto Region (Bortoli 
2005), where chronic disputes, mostly regarding contested property boundaries, 
have exhausted energies and financial resources on both sides and have ultimately 
compromised the effectiveness of local institutions in managing natural resources 
and fostering local socio-economic development.
In light of their responses, respondents indicated whether and to what extent 
they considered the need for their administrations to interface with regole. The 
grey bars in Figure 6 represent their assessment of the present situation, whereas 
black bars refer to the ideal. In the latter case, a tendency of respondents to polar-
ize responses to worst or best-case scenarios was noted. Positive evaluations 
counterbalanced negative ones, but the present situation was generally evaluated 
less positively than the ideal.
4.6. Occurrence, frequency and severity of social conflicts
With respect to institutional disputes, according to interviewees, social conflicts 
were more frequent and serious (Figures 4 and 5). Disputes occurred mostly 
because of a perceived discrimination by regole between their members and the 
broader community comprising the municipality. Several specific reasons for 
social conflicts were reported, including: (i) the extreme difficulty, near impos-
sibility in some cases, of being accepted into the member of a regola for those 
who are not descendants of households with historical roots in the village; (ii) the 
sometimes hostile attitude of some regola members towards outsiders; (iii) the 
male dominated gender balance within regole – in some cases, women are not 
considered members with full rights because of persistent constitutional rules; 
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Figure 5: Severity of the institutional and social tensions reported in Figure 4, as perceived by 
local municipality representatives.
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(iv) the exclusion of non-members from the possibility of enjoying typical ben-
efits distributed by regole to their members, e.g. firewood, grants for newly mar-
ried couples, scholarships for students, subsidies for construction or renovation 
of houses; (v) differences in opinion on institutional relationships between regole 
and municipalities. It was suggested that non-members of regole often have a 
poor opinion of regole as institutions, considering them scarcely or not at all inte-
grated into the local social environment (Figure 7). Even if explicit protests rarely 
emerged, respondents claimed that these perceptions could in some cases under-
mine social cohesion within the community. In other situations, however, they 
could help drive change and adaptation.
4.7. Effectiveness of regole in promoting local development
Municipal representatives were asked to assess the effectiveness of local regole 
in pursuing the role assigned to them by the Regional Law, i.e. promoting sus-
tainable management of resources, environmental, conservation and, in general, 
the socio-economic development of mountainous areas. Results are depicted in 
Figure 8.
(i) Forest management and environmental conservation. Interviewees 
often observed that forest management has improved since regole have 
taken up management responsibilities. They highlighted that reinvest-
ments of forest revenues in commonly held lands have increased since 
regole have taken over forest management. Indeed, municipalities were 
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Figure 6: In the light of considerations and results shown in Figure 4, respondents indicated to 
what extent they considered positive or negative their necessity to interface with regole. Grey 
bars represent their evaluations of the present scenario, whereas black bars display assess-
ments referring to an ideal point.
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ing non-rights holders, may generate various social tensions of different nature and/or inten-
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Figure 8: The figure shows the results of municipal representatives’ assessments of the effective-
ness of local regole in pursuing the objectives laid out by the Regional Law – i.e. environmental 
conservation and management and socio-economic development of mountain areas. Results are 
shown in ascending order, from the worst to the best overall evaluation.
obliged by the law to reinvest at least 10% of forest revenues, but this 
threshold was seldom exceeded. The statutes of the regole, on the other 
hand, identify forest management as a core responsibility and set much 
higher rates of reinvestment. Criticism of the approaches taken by regole 
to broader environmental management and conservation were raised 
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only twice by municipal representatives (14.3%). In one case, the State 
Forest Police levied fines on a regola because of unauthorized harvesting. 
This was explained as the outcome of the regola’s intolerance towards 
the bureaucracy combined with a traditional practice-oriented mentality.
(ii) Social development. In line with what has already been reported in sec-
tion 4.6, 78.5% of respondents were critical of the action of regole in the 
area of social development. Reference was often made to the “close-mind-
edness” of some regola members, especially the elderly, who, as house-
hold heads, hold power to vote in the assembly of the regola and therefore 
have significant influence. Municipal representatives also claimed that 
regole should provide more support to the welfare strategies of municipal-
ities, as these are targeted to the whole local community and not towards 
regola members only. Respondents observed that the general assembly of 
local regole exert high levels of control – due to right holders’ attitudes – 
even concerning ordinary decisions regarding environmental matters 
undertaken by municipalities. From this perspective, the reported occur-
rence of some social tensions could be attributed to the increased par-
ticipation of local people in municipal administrative life and local policy 
processes. Indeed, to validate particular decisions (i.e. land use changes), 
in some cases a regola’s statutory rules call for high levels of consensus to 
be reached in the regola’s assembly. Such a mechanism would encourage 
the adoption of shared policy decisions, though triggering heated debates 
and discussions throughout decision-making processes. Notably, regola 
members often represent a relevant share of the local population and as 
such, they can strongly influence local elections.
(iii) Local economic development. Positive and negative evaluations were 
balanced regarding the interaction with regole on issues of local economic 
development. Interviewees expressed positive evaluations concern-
ing regole’s commitment to environmental management. Regole were 
regarded to have improved systems for the sales of timber. Particularly, 
they noted that regole increased timber revenues and stimulated the 
establishment of new local forest enterprises through more careful plan-
ning of timber sales and investments in maintenance and development 
of the forest road network required for forest harvesting. Nonetheless, 
administrative representatives claimed that regole were inclined to adopt 
“standard” management practices rather than innovative ones. For exam-
ple, branches and harvesting waste were not extracted from the forest 
and no bioenergy investments have been made. They also observed that 
cooperation between regole is still largely missing in this field, as demon-
strated by the lack of local sawmills. These limitations were attributed to 
a hesitant or even conservative attitude of regole in response to proposals 
launched by municipalities.
(iv) Tourism. Interviewees positively reported cases of regole directly 
involved in tourism activities. Examples referred of Regole managing 
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local ski areas, restoring abandoned alpine pasture lands and huts, man-
aging agricultural-tourism enterprises and producing local cheeses and 
other dairy products. However, negative evaluations of the attitude of 
regole towards local development were also given. A locally well-known 
case was reported of several regole that took a strong position against 
a ski area development project in open defiance of the intentions of the 
local municipalities. Interviewees claimed that, in this case, the member-
ship of these regole were driven by a “traditional logic”, closely related 
to forestry and pasture management, and not oriented towards “new” 
complementary goods and services. 
In general, our results give a multifaceted picture of the relationships between 
municipalities and regole, which, in the perception of the majority of munici-
palities, are characterized predominantly by positive evaluations. A relevant and 
unexpected outcome was that municipal representatives cited the need not only 
to coordinate between municipalities and regole, but also among different regole. 
Thus, the claim was asserted that broader cooperation between actors at  the 
municipal level of governance, could lead to positive governance outcomes. The 
presence of regola members on the municipal administration was not a discrimi-
nating feature in either positive or negative institutional relationships: indeed, 
regola members were well represented on almost every town council. Rather, the 
results suggest that municipal representatives valued having multiple contact per-
sons between these two bodies. To this end, mechanisms to enforce stable, robust 
and enduring cooperation were judged to be worthwhile. Where the institutional 
coordination of responsibilities was more extensive, that is, where joint action 
was undertaken more regularly with regards to forest management and other 
social and economic development matters, fewer social and institutional tensions 
emerged. As such, overlapping administrative activities in multiple policy arenas 
were indicative of higher levels of collaboration.
Interestingly, municipal representatives frequently stated that forest landscape 
management had improved since regole re-obtained ownership rights over former 
public forests, which sometimes also had the positive spin-off of relieving munic-
ipalities of a difficult and time-consuming administrative burden. Renewed con-
trol by regole over forest resources was also linked to confidence by interviewees 
that speculative actions with detrimental social and environmental consequences 
would be avoided in relation the local forest landscape.
Although tensions arose where both municipalities and regole claimed admin-
istrative jurisdiction over specific management roles or resources, this was not 
always the case, and problems in institutional coordination were not always the 
outcome.
 We noted that tensions were often borne out of disputes on changes in 
territorial jurisdictions, where administrative rights and duties in areas where ter-
ritorial control has been returned to regole remained unclear. Sometimes, regole 
had a hostile attitude toward outsiders, driven by “feelings of power” with regard 
to their land, as if it were their own individual property. This result in particular 
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corroborates previous work in the area (Hampel 2012). These issues were still in 
the process of being addressed in the area concerned. Nonetheless, municipal rep-
resentatives were often confident that relationships with regole would improve in 
the future, both in terms of overall frequency and quality of interaction. This con-
viction was based on progress towards resolution of pending legal disputes which 
contributed to overcoming past hostilities and tensions, and a feeling that munici-
palities and regole needed to cooperate more closely in order to better cope with 
the ongoing process of institutional re-organization, which was perceived to have 
otherwise unfavourable consequences in terms of local territorial development.
5. Conclusions
This paper aimed at exploring the institutional interplay between municipalities 
and regole in the mountainous areas of the Veneto Region. We chose to analyze 
the viewpoint of municipalities, which, while more empowered in institutional 
relationships than regole, are at the same time most at risk from the institutional 
reforms affecting the public sector. In this way, we feel we can offer insights into 
local governance in mountainous areas in Veneto while well aware that a com-
plete picture of the situation will be achieved only when the perspective of the 
regole are also considered. The context of rapid institutional change and devo-
lution in the Veneto Region, carried out under a policy of decentralization, has 
meant a shift of administrative rights and responsibilities to local actors, at the 
same time coupled with potentially debilitating changes in budgets, organiza-
tions and responsibilities. The polycentric governance literature has supported 
our exploration of the quality and degree of collaboration, power dynamics, coor-
dination of responsibilities, and degree of decision-making autonomy of actors 
and institutions. We showed how municipalities have dealt with such changes in 
relation to regole, which, under the Regional Law, are also expected to fulfill new 
roles in relation to local territorial development and natural resource governance.
The results of our work provide evidence that relationships between munici-
palities and regole are for the most part synergistic. Municipalities have adapted 
to a new institutional context, demonstrating willingness to share responsibili-
ties and support values of the regole. Despite the re-allocation of property rights, 
which was perceived to be a potential source of conflict, municipal decisions are 
formulated taking into account the need for creation of the appropriate linkages 
with local regole. As such, we found that the authority of municipalities is very 
seldom contested by regole. Where tensions or discontent have emerged, they 
have been mostly resolved or considered as reflecting a need for greater coordi-
nation between these two centers of local governance over and above what was 
called for in the 1996 legislation. Indeed, local administrators have indicated their 
willingness to broaden their collaboration with the regole within their municipal 
territory. This represents a local polycentric governance innovation that has only 
partially received policy support at the regional level, but which has been identi-
fied by municipalities as having potential positive impacts on local governance 
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and coordination. To the extent that they are seeking greater synergy with local 
regole, it appears that municipalities will continue to play a key role in shaping 
local-level socio-economic dynamics in the foreseeable future, maintaining their 
position as the local institutional reference point for mountain areas in the Veneto 
Region. 
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